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I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to convince an individual, through the art of honest persuasion, of the
righteousness of a belief is celebrated, however, in failure of such persuasion,
compelling that person to act contradictory to their retained ideal is detestable. The
free will to reject a movement or disagree with a practice is the sort of liberty this
Nation was founded upon, yet today the potential exists that many in the
pharmaceutical profession will be forced into behaviors repugnant to their basic
standards of goodness and morality. The proliferation of abortive and contraceptive
drug therapies has thrust many pharmacists into roles as facilitators of practices they
77
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oppose on fundamental levels without a corresponding ability to opt out of such
action.
When a patient desires drug therapies that, in the eyes of the pharmacist, are
likely to destroy an unborn human life, the pro-life pharmacist is left in an unsettling
position: accommodate the patient and breach basic moral principles or adhere to
conscience and risk liability and disciplinary action.1 Unlike physicians and nurses,
who are protected by legislation passed in the wake of abortion’s legalization,2
pharmacists who follow their conscience by refusing to dispense controversial
medications or referring to a willing pharmacist have no reliable legal or professional
basis to prevent or rectify retaliatory action by employers, patients, and peers.3
Solving this predicament is especially difficult in light of the pharmacist’s
professional ethical duty to promote the patient’s best interests.4
The purpose of this Note is not to argue for or against either the pro-life or prochoice positions. The purpose of this Note is to shed light on a serious moral
dilemma that faces many pharmacists today, to call for universal acceptance in the
pharmacy profession of a right of conscience, and to suggest adequate state and
national legislative measures that would protect and prevent pharmacists from
having to act contrary to their basic moral convictions.
Section I provides background regarding present day abortive and contraceptive
drug therapies and the role of the pharmacist in providing such medications. Section
II is presented to provide some perspective and background as to moral belief
regarding abortion and emergency contraception (EC) and how such a belief may
conflict with a pharmacist’s professional duties. The discussion of the tension
between moral and professional duties illustrates that the beliefs regarding abortion
and EC of the pharmacist who chooses conscience over professional duty are
genuinely fundamental and deserve respect. Section III illustrates the detrimental
consequences that choosing conscience could wreak. Section IV sheds light on the
inadequacy of current common and statutory law that could feasibly protect the
pharmacist’s moral convictions from retaliation or liability. Finally, Section V
proposes that professional pharmaceutical organizations lead the way to recognizing
a true right of conscience, which would eventually result in universal legislation
protecting against all potential ramifications of choosing conscience.
II. SECTION I: ANTI-REPRODUCTION PILLS AND THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE
A. The Pills
On September 28, 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the
drug mifepristone, formerly known as RU-486, for use in the United States as an
abortifacient.5 Mifepristone had previously been approved and is currently used in

1

See infra Section III.

2

See infra Section IV.C.

3

See infra Section IV.

4

See infra Section II.

5

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS News, FDA Approves
Mifepristone for the Termination of Early Pregnancy (Sept. 28, 2000), available at
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some European countries, including France, England, and Sweden.6 Although
mifepristone has other potential uses, such as postcoital contraception and daily-use
birth control,7 its FDA approved use is as an early pregnancy abortifacient.8
Mifepristone acts as an anti-hormone and precludes a woman’s uterus from
retaining an implanted fertilized egg.9 The drug blocks progesterone, an essential
hormone in the acceptance and retention of an implanted egg within a woman’s
uterus; and, when taken in concurrence with misoprostol, induces a spontaneous
abortion.10 The fact that the mifepristone abortion regimen acts to destroy an
implanted egg as opposed to a fertilized yet not implanted egg, is what distinguishes
it from emergency contraception.
Drugs used post-coitally with the intent to prevent the development of a
pregnancy are referred to as emergency contraception.11 This labeling as emergency
contraception is a bit conclusory, as the definition of whether use of such drugs is
contraception or abortion lies at the heart of the controversy over them.12 However,
for purposes of convenience and clarity, this Note will refer to drug regimens
consumed post-intercourse for the purpose of preventing the onset or continuance of
pregnancy as emergency contraception (EC), as that is the term that has been
attached to them in modern medical, social, and political arenas.
Notwithstanding this controversy, the physical and biological effects of orally
administered EC, often referred to as the morning-after pill, are not in dispute. EC
may prevent the development of a pregnancy by inhibiting any of four successive
biological events, either pre or post fertilization, necessary to establish and maintain
a pregnancy.13 EC works before fertilization by either suppressing ovulation, like
regular birth-control pills, or preventing fertilization of an egg by inhibiting the
movement of the sperm or the egg.14 If an egg becomes fertilized, then EC may
disrupt transport of the fertilized egg to the uterus or, if the transport through the
fallopian tube is complete, prevent the implantation of the fertilized egg in the
woman’s uterus.15 EC is most effective when used up to seventy-two hours after
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/NEW00737.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter
HHS News].
6

Id.

7

Gwendolyn Prothro, RU 486 Examined: Impact of a New Technology on an Old
Controversy, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 715, 728 (1997).
8

See HHS News, supra note 5.

9

Prothro, supra note 7, at 724.

10

Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Mifepristone: A Brief History, at
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/ library/ABORTION/Mifepristone.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2002) [hereinafter Planned Parenthood].
11
AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION
CONTRACEPTION: THE PHARMACIST’S ROLE 1 (2000).

SPECIAL

REPORT,

EMERGENCY

12

See infra Section II.

13

AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.

14

Id.; see also Jane E. Brody, Pregnancy Prevention, the Morning After, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10, 2001 (Late Edition), at F8.
15

Id.
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unprotected intercourse and becomes completely ineffective after implantation
occurs, usually six or seven days after intercourse.16
B. The Pharmacist’s Role
During the past twenty years emergency contraception pills (ECPs) have been
available to and used by American women.17 During this time frame non-emergency
oral contraceptives (those taken as a daily pre-intercourse regimen) were used offlabel as emergency contraception18 and were distributed as such “primarily in
hospital emergency rooms, reproductive health clinics, and university health
centers.”19 These medical facilities would repackage oral contraceptives for use as
emergency contraception; pharmacies associated with certain clinics would
repackage oral contraceptives into EC regimens and label them as such; and private
physicians would instruct patients to take a larger dosage of their regular birth
control pills as EC.20
In 1998 the FDA approved the Preven Emergency Contraceptive Kit, an EC
based on the Yuzpe regimen.21 In 1999, the FDA also approved Plan B, another EC
regimen.22 While different regimens of oral contraceptives had been distributed and
used before 1998 as emergency contraceptives, Preven and Plan B are the first
regimens specifically approved by the FDA as safe and effective emergency
contraceptives, to be packaged and marketed as such.23 Additionally, modified doses
of oral contraceptives, not specifically packaged for use as an EC, can still be
prescribed in doses that would effect emergency contraception if doctor and patient
desire such a method.24
Emergency contraception pills are classified as prescription drugs,25 and “states
are delegated the power and responsibility of determining which health care
professionals … have prescriptive authority.”26 Currently, many states have

16

AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1, 4.

17

AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.

18

Heather M. Field, Increasing Access to Emergency Contraceptive Pills Through State
Law Enabled Dependent Pharmacist Prescribers, 11 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 147 (2000).
19

AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.

20

Renee C. Wyser-Pratte, Protection of RU-486 as Contraception, Emergency
Contraception and as an Abortifacient Under the Law of Contraception, 79 OR. L. REV. 1121,
1135 (2000).
21

AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2. The
Yuzpe regimen was the first EC drug formulation and was described by Albert Yuzpe and
colleagues in 1974. Id.at 1.
22

Id. at 2.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 6.

25

Id. at 2; see generally Field, supra note 18.

26

See Field, supra note 18, at 223-24 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1994)).
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authorized collaborative practices that have expanded the role of pharmacists.27
These collaborative practices generally authorize greater independence of the
pharmacist to initiate drug therapies not specifically prescribed by a patient’s
physician or other authorized health care professional.28 In other words, some
patients may not require a prescription from their doctor before being distributed
certain medications or drugs from a pharmacist. However, with the exception of
Washington, California, and Alaska,29 states do not authorize this expanded
pharmacist role in the distribution of ECPs. Pharmacists are generally limited to
dispensing ECPs specifically prescribed by some other authorized health care
professional. Other general duties of a pharmacist in the distribution of ECPs may
include counseling and educating women on EC use at the time the prescription is
filled.30
In Washington, California, and Alaska, pharmacists have the dual authority to
prescribe and dispense ECPs under each state’s respective collaborative practices.31
Generally speaking, the pharmacist may dispense ECPs in accordance with
“standardized procedures or protocols developed by the pharmacist and an
authorized prescriber[.]”32 Thus, a woman need not receive authorization from her
doctor prior to buying ECPs; the pharmacist acts not as a third party or indirect
provider of ECPs, but as a direct provider in accordance with a general collaborative
protocol.
If pro-choice groups and the American Medical Association have their way,
pharmacists will have no future role in ECPs. This is because these groups support
an FDA reclassification of ECPs as over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, rather than
prescription.33 Many pro-choice groups claim as a top goal the persuasion of the
FDA to reclassify ECPs as OTC.34 If OTC status were granted, then “women would
be able to get ECPs without encountering any type of health care provider.”35
27

Id. at 226. The expansion of pharmacist’s authority may include “1) the administration
of immunizations/vaccines; 2) substitution power for prescribed drugs or some degree of
selection power of particular drugs for certain conditions; and 3) patient-specific or general
drug therapy management.” Id.
28

Id. at 229-30.

29

Heidi Welborn, Expanding the Pharmacist’s Role in Providing Emergency
Contraception, 41 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N 767 (2001).
30

AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 10.

31

Welborn, supra note 29, at 767; see also Field, supra note 18, at 231-32 (citing
Washington state statutes and regulations that authorize pharmacist to prescribe ECPs); CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4052(8) (West 1996) (California statute authorizing pharmacist
prescriptive power over ECPs).
32

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4052(8).

33

See Welborn, supra note 29, at 768.

34

Cheryl Wetzstein, In an Emergency; Advocates Push Access to 72-Hour Birth Control,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, at A2 (citing groups such as Advocates for Youth, Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, and the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League).
35

Field, supra note 18, at 200.
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OTC status for ECPs is not generally supported by pharmacists however,36 and is
not likely in today’s political climate. Advocates on both sides of the issue believe
the Bush administration, with its influence on the FDA, will delay or negate a switch
in classification from prescription to OTC.37 The behavioral and social policy
concerns raised by ECPs38 “may make switching ECPs to OTC status a politically
unpopular move.”39 In any event, ECPs are currently available only by prescription.
Many restrictions have been imposed by the FDA in the use and distribution of
mifepristone. First, the drug can only be used during the first forty-nine days after a
woman’s last menstrual cycle.40 Also, the drug is distributed to women directly from
doctors and certain health clinics.41 Mifepristone “is not and will not be available in
pharmacies[.]”42 Thus, under the current FDA restrictions, pharmacists have no role
in mifepristone-induced abortions.
While current mifepristone use is much lower than expected since its FDA
approval and subsequent availability to the public,43 some signals suggest that future
use or access may become more widespread. A survey of doctors by the Kaiser
Family Foundation discovered that twenty-three percent of doctors said they were
“likely” to offer mifepristone in 2002; up from the seven percent that actually
provided the drug since its approval.44 Also, health centers offering mifepristone
have reported a ninety-nine percent rate of abortion in women who have taken the
drug.45 An expected increase in availability, a near perfect rate of achieving the
desired ends of abortion, together with continued efforts by pro-choice groups, such
36

See Welborn, supra note 29, at 768.

37

Doug Thomas, After Sex Pill Gets New Push, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 20, 2001, at
1 (quoting representatives of Planned Parenthood and Metro Right to Life, both of whom
believe OTC status is not forthcoming in the near future).
38

OTC status may magnify controversial issues such as promiscuity, sexually transmitted
diseases, availability of counseling and health care, and the abortion/contraception
controversy. Field, supra note 18, at 204.
39

Id. at 204.

40

U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Mifepristone Questions and Answers, at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/mifepristone/
mifepristone-qa.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002) [hereinafter FDA].
41
See HHS News, supra note 5. Only doctors and other health care providers that meet
certain qualifications mandated by the FDA may distribute mifepristone. Some of these
required qualifications include the ability to determine the duration of the woman’s pregnancy
and provide surgical abortion in the case the drug regimen fails to procure an abortion.
42

See FDA, supra note 40.

43

See Julia Duin, Just 7% of U.S. Doctors Prescribe Abortion Pill, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2001, at A3. Only six percent of gynecologists and one percent of family practice doctors
surveyed prescribed the drug since its approval. Id.
44

Evan Henderson, Abortion Pill Not yet a Frequent Choice, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov.
12, 2001, at L6.
45
One Year After Approval of Mifepristone, Planned Parenthood Reports Widespread
Satisfaction Among Patients and Providers, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 24, 2001, 2001 WL
21898499 [hereinafter Planned Parenthood II].
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as Planned Parenthood, to increase accessibility to abortion,46 could be the impetus to
pharmaceutical distribution of mifepristone in the future.
FDA approval of mifepristone and ECPs, such as Preven and Plan B, has made
drug related reproductive therapy a real and potentially widespread option for
women. Marketing campaigns by women’s and abortion-rights groups and the drug
manufacturers themselves will further introduce these drug options to women. This
drug therapy revolution of sorts has expanded the pharmacist’s role in the provision
of emergency contraception, and perhaps, in the future, the provision of
mifepristone.
The more women that are aware of and desire EC, the more involved and
important pharmacists will become in the contraception process. One can imagine
that if more and more states adopt the liberal EC distribution procedures of
Washington and California, then pharmacists would become the primary providers of
ECPs. And if mifepristone distribution restrictions are relaxed, pharmacists could
feasibly become key players in the furnishing of abortion drugs as well. Whether
they like it or not, pharmacists are being thrust into the role of common, everyday
providers of controversial reproductive medications47, and this position may put
some pharmacists in the predicament of having to choose between their moral
convictions regarding EC and abortion and the patient’s wishes.
III. SECTION II: THE NATURE OF THE MORAL DILEMMA
This section entails examining the rationale of believing abortion and EC are
morally wrong accompanied by an examination of the nature of a pharmacist’s
ethical obligation to her patients.48 Understanding these competing interests allows
us to better appreciate that the serious pharmacist who chooses conscience over
professional duty is surely abiding by a fundamental tenet in her life; fundamental
principles such as these must be protected, not punished.
A. Abortion Viewpoints
The mere mention of abortion can instill passion into any argument unlike any
modern day controversy. Whether or not a woman’s Constitutional right to abortion
is affirmed for all time, unified agreement on the morality (or immorality) of the
procedure of terminating a pregnancy will certainly never be reached. However,
even those who defend the right to abortion believe “that it is intrinsically a bad
thing, a kind of cosmic shame, when a human life at any stage is deliberately
extinguished.”49 People have a general agreement about the sanctity of unborn
human life.50
46

See id. The President of Planned Parenthood was quoted as stating that her organization
“will continue to work to expand availability of [mifepristone] and other advances in
reproductive health care[.]”
47

See supra Section II.

48

In this section the terms “ethical” and “professional” are used synonymously.

49

RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 91-92 (1993).

50

Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of Life’s Dominion, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 160, 164 (1995) (book review); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life,
103 YALE L.J. 2049, 2070 (1994) (book review and critique of LIFE’S DOMINION).
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Thus, the controversy arises when weighing unborn life against the life of the
would-be mother.51 Varying convictions regarding the morality of abortion emerge
dependant upon how each individual person weighs the natural and human
“investments” in unborn life against the toll on the natural and human “investments”
in the woman that childbirth would bring.52 Abortion proponents, while recognizing
the sanctity of unborn life, give priority to the woman’s life53 in varying
circumstances.54 Thus, abortion proponents say, while abortion has “negative moral
significance,” it is, on the whole, morally justified in light of the woman’s life.55
However, opponents of abortion believe that it is wrong in all or most
circumstances at any point during a pregnancy.56 Some abortion opponents base this
belief on the premise that unborn life is human with a fundamental right to continued
life, and thus abortion is morally unjustified in all circumstances.57 Most opponents
base their belief on the premise that the sanctity of unborn life, while having no
rights itself, always outweighs the woman’s life, except in extreme circumstances,
such as rape.58 As abortion proponents recognize the sanctity of the fetus, abortion
opponents recognize the values sacrificed and difficulties encountered by denying
abortion.59 However, opponents “proclaim … that none of these reasons can ever
objectively confer the right to dispose of another’s life, even when that life is only
beginning”; and further that “[l]ife is too fundamental a value to be weighed against
even very serious disadvantages.”60

51

See Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2050.

52

Id. at 2070.

53

This word is used with respect to the woman’s lifestyle and general happiness, not
necessarily as a reference to the life or death of the woman.
54

See Kamm, supra note 50, at 164; Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2069-70.

55

Kamm, supra note 50, at 164; Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2070.

56

The Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured
Abortion, ¶ 17, (Nov. 18, 1974), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19741118_declaration-abortion_en.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Declaration on Procured Abortion].
57

See generally id.

58

Rakowski, supra note 50, at 2070. Dworkin argues that most abortion opponents do not
believe that fetuses are “babies” with rights and interests. The argument, quite simply, is this:
fetuses are, at least in the early and middle stages of pregnancy unconscious beings. Only
sentient beings have “rights and interests.” Thus, fetuses themselves have no rights or
interests. Most abortion opponents must then have a “detached objection” to abortion – one
that does not presuppose a fetus to have rights and interests. For Dworkin, this must be true to
rationalize the rape and “life of the mother” exceptions of most abortion opponents. See id. at
2055-56.
59

See Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 56, ¶ 14.

60

Id. Of course, there are those abortion opponents who allow for exceptions in extreme
circumstances such as rape. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

2002-03]

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE

85

B. Emergency Contraception: Abortion?
The current debate over mifepristone is one of access and opportunity – abortion
opponents see the approval of mifepristone as a more accessible and convenient
method of abortion. No debate exists over whether mifepristone acts as an
abortifacient. Thus, the above viewpoints on the morality of abortion clearly apply
to the use and provision of mifepristone. However, the morality of ECPs in the
abortion context is not as clear. The ambiguity of whether ECPs fit into the abortion
debate is a result of a separate, yet related, question: when human life begins. For if
life does not begin until the fertilized egg becomes implanted in the woman’s uterus,
then ECPs do not effect an abortion.61 But, for those that believe that life
commences at fertilization, then ECPs, with their potential to destroy a fertilized egg,
effect an abortion. The question of when life begins has given rise to a debate within
a debate: assuming abortion is immoral, is EC abortion? – that is, does life begin at
fertilization or implantation? Science and the Roman Catholic Church62 offer some
guidance on the issue, however inconsistent and convoluted.
1. The Science of Life’s Beginnings: The Impetus to the Debate
The fertilization of a woman’s egg, occurring after intercourse, is “the merger of
egg and sperm into a genetically complete entity.”63 First, the sperm must capacitate,
a process not thoroughly understood by the medical community, which entails the
sperm’s “acquisition of fertilizing ability through exposure to the female
reproductive tract.”64 Capacitation takes approximately five to six hours.65 Then,
once the sperm and egg, which each have twenty-three chromosomes, “have
combined those chromosomes into a single 46-chromosone nucleus” fertilization is
complete.66 This combination process takes approximately twelve hours.67 Thus,
the fertilization process, which takes place in the fallopian tube, is complete
approximately seventeen to eighteen hours after intercourse, and mitotic divisions of
the fertilized egg commence.68 The fertilized egg is called a zygote.69
The zygote remains in the fallopian tube for three to four days, where cleavage –
mitotic divisions of the zygote into multiple cells - occurs and continues through the
61

See supra Section I.

62

As the Roman Catholic Church has been an impassioned protector of the unborn,
discussion of religious teachings and traditions on life’s beginnings is limited to those of the
Roman Catholic Church. A discussion of other denomination’s beliefs is beyond the scope of
this note.
63

Elizabeth Spahn and Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in
Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F.L REV. 261, 293 (1998).
64

LUIGI MASTROIANNI, JR., EPILOGUE TO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT IN
VITRO 356 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. & John D. Biggers eds., 1981).
65

Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 293.

66

STUART IRA FOX, HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY 618 (4th ed. 1993).

67

Id.

68

Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 293.

69

Id.

86

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 17:77

implantation process.70 The zygote travels through the fallopian tube to the uterus
(where it becomes a morula).71 Once in the uterus, the morula “floats” in suspension
and, after approximately three days, implants itself into the uterine wall (and is called
a blastocyst). Thus, implantation occurs about seven days after intercourse.72
The American Medical Association (AMA) equates conception, and in effect the
beginning of life, with the implantation of the blastocyst in the woman’s uterus.73
This theory is in accord with various medical dictionaries’ definitions of
conception.74
2. The Teachings of the Roman Catholic Church
The Roman Catholic Church’s official teaching and belief is that life begins, and
conception occurs, at fertilization.75 Fusing science and religion, the Roman
Catholic Church claims confirmation of its belief from modern genetics, in that “the
program of what this living being will be” is established from “the first instant.”76
The Roman Catholic Church recognizes a distinction between life’s commencement
and the moment of “ensoulment” – when the body and soul fuse.77 However, a
unanimous tradition on when ensoulment occurs does not exist.78 Both Saint
Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas taught that ensoulment occurred forty to
eighty days after conception, not at the instant of conception,79 and current authors
are still in disagreement.80 Nevertheless, that the moment of human life, with or
without soul, commences at fertilization is not in dispute within the Church.81

70

ARTHUR C. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 1033-34 (9th ed. 1996).

71

Id. At this point the morula is a mass of sixteen to thirty-two cells. Id.; see also HUMAN
PHYSIOLOGY 675 (Arthur J. Vander et al. eds., 6th ed. 1993)).
72
HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY, supra note 71, at 677; ELAINE N. MARIEB, ESSENTIALS OF HUMAN
ANATOMY & PHYSIOLOGY 480 (4th ed. 1994).
73

Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 294.

74

See id. at 333 n.205 (citing SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL-LEGAL
DICTIONARY 131 (Supp. 1992) (defining conception as “the onset of pregnancy, marked by
implantation of the blastocyst”); ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND
ALLIED HEALTH 258 (3rd ed. 1983) (defining conception as “the onset of pregnancy, marked
by implantation of the blastocyst; the formation of a viable zygote”); 1 OXFORD COMPANION
TO MEDICINE 254 (1986) (defining conception as “the fertilization of an ovum by a
spermatozoon and the implantation of the resulting zygote”)); but see infra note 83.
75

“From the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the
father nor of the mother, it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth.”
Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 56, ¶ 12.
76

Id. ¶ 13.

77

See id. ¶ 13 n.19.

78

See id.

79

See Spahn and Andrade, supra note 63, at 270-71.

80

Id.

81

Declaration on Procured Abortion, supra note 56, ¶ 13 n.19.
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Further, recognition of abortion, even before ensoulment, as a grave fault was and is
unanimous.82
While not all abortion opponents are Catholic, the Church’s teachings have
resonated with many Americans.83 Most people believe abortion is morally wrong
most of the time.84 Some of the people opposed to abortion are pharmacists.85 And
even more importantly, some pharmacists believe life begins at fertilization, and thus
find EC to be an early form of abortion.86 The pharmacist who holds these principals
dearly will face the dilemma of having to choose between her conscience and her
professional duties.
C. The Pharmacist’s Professional Ethical Obligations
Pharmacy is a profession, and much like the professions of medicine and law,
entails a duty to assure and promote the patient’s best interests.87 As professionals,
pharmacists are expected to give priority to the patient’s interests over their own
immediate interests.88 As key players in the implementation of drug therapies,
pharmacists are expected to withhold drugs “from those who have no authority to use
them” and not to withhold “medications from those who do have authority to use
them.”89
The patient’s best interests are the pharmacist’s primary commitment and
concern. Among other things, pharmacists are expected to “help individuals achieve
optimum benefit from their medications, to be committed to their welfare, and to
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Id. ¶ 7.
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See Cheryl Wetzstein, Advocates of Emergency Contraception have Begun a Campaign
Designed to Expand Access to 72-Hour Birth Control Pills, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Feb. 4,
2002, 2002 WL 8338126. The presidents of two different organizations, Life Issues Institute
and American Life League “maintain[] that medical groups are wrong when they say
pregnancy begins after implantation in the womb” and thus ECPs are “very, very early
abortive drug[s].” Id. The article also states that over 100 doctors “have signed a statement
questioning federal designation of EC as ‘contraception.’” Id.
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See Public Agenda, Abortion: Major Proposals, at http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/
pcc_detail.cfm?issue_type=abortion&list=2 (last visited Feb. 20, 2002) (a public opinion poll
by a nonprofit, bipartisan organization). The question: is abortion morally wrong most of the
time? Fifty-five percent polled answered yes. Thirty percent answered no. Id.
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See, e.g., Pharmacists for Life International, at http://www.pfli.org/main.
php?pfi=aboutus.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) [hereinafter PFLI]. Pharmacists for Life
International (PFLI) is the only exclusively pro-life pharmacy association. It represents
almost 1500 pharmacists, and hundreds of lay supporters worldwide. Id.
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Id.
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William L. Allen & David B. Brushwood, Pharmaceutically Assisted Death and the
Pharmacist’s Right of Conscience, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAW 1 (1996).
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Stephanie E. Harvey, EiLun Lu, Oscar Rivas, & Julie Rodgers, Do Pharmacists Have
the Right to Refuse to Dispense a Prescription Based on Personal Beliefs?, at http://www.nmpharmacy.com/body_rights.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2002) [hereinafter Harvey].
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Allen & Brushwood, supra note 87, at 2.
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maintain their trust”90; to place “concern for the well-being of the patient at the
center of professional practice” taking into consideration the “needs stated by the
patient”;91 and to hold “the patient’s welfare paramount.”92 Further, patient
autonomy and “personal and cultural differences among patients” must be respected
by the pharmacist.93 These professional duties, and others, encompass the
“collective conscience” of the pharmaceutical profession, and their implementation
by each pharmacist is considered a moral obligation.94
When presented with a validly authorized prescription for a legal medication, by
a patient aware of the risks involved in taking the medication, and for whom the
medication would be reasonably safe, the aforementioned principles and
expectations leave the pharmacist with an ethical duty to fill and dispense the
prescription.95 The duty to dispense in these circumstances may give rise to a serious
conflict between the pharmacist’s personal conviction concerning abortion and her
professional duty to the patient.
In 1998, the American Pharmaceutical Association (APhA), and subsequently
various other pharmaceutical organizations, eased the conflict between personal and
professional morals by adopting policies recognizing a pharmacist’s right to refuse
dispensing medications based on the pharmacist’s personal beliefs.96 However, if the
pharmacist exercises her right of conscience and refuses to fill the prescription, the
duty to the patient is not extinguished, and could be fulfilled by referring the patient
to another pharmacist or distributor. 97 In any event, “the patient should not be
required to abide by the pharmacist’s personal, moral decision.”98 For many
pharmacists, a referral would be no more than passive participation in the activity

90

American Pharmaceutical Association, Code of Ethics for Pharmacists, available at
http://www.aphanet.org/pharmcare/ethics.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Code of
Ethics].
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American Pharmaceutical Association, Principles of Practice for Pharmaceutical Care,
available at http://www.aphanet.org/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2002).
93

Code of Ethics, supra note 90.
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American Pharmaceutical Association, 1997-98 Policy Committee Report, Pharmacist
Conscience Clause, available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/committee2.html (last visited
Dec. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Committee Report].
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Id.; Harvey, supra note 88.
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American Pharmaceutical Association, Report of the House Delegates, Subject:
Pharmacist Conscience Clause, available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/hod.html (last visited
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pharmacist’s right to exercise conscientious refusal and supports the establishment of systems
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they initially refused to actively assist.99 Thus the dilemma, while transformed into
whether to refer or not, is equally troublesome to the pharmacist.
IV. SECTION III: THE POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF CHOOSING CONSCIENCE
The pharmacist who ultimately decides that her moral convictions regarding
abortion outweigh her professional obligation to the patient may refuse to fill the
prescription and refer the patient to another pharmacist; or, the pharmacist with
conscientious objection may refuse to dispense and refuse to refer. While the former
decision will, in practical terms, shield the pharmacist from most negative
consequences, the latter decision could have serious implications for the pharmacist,
including employment termination or demotion, civil tort liability, or disciplinary
action from the state pharmacy board.
A. Employment Ramifications
A pharmacist who follows her conscience may be terminated or demoted by her
employer. The employment-at-will rule provides the employer with great leeway in
terminating or demoting a pharmacist: employment may be terminated or diminished
for any or no reason.100 Because of the immediate low cost and convenience to the
employer, termination or demotion is probably the most likely and frequent
detriment to a pharmacist who chooses to follow her conscience.
The ongoing story of Karen Brauer is an illustration of this possibility. Ms.
Brauer, a pro-life pharmacist who believes EC is an early form of abortion, often
turned away prescriptions for EC regimens during her employment at a large
commercial pharmacy.101 On one occasion, a patient came to the pharmacy with a
valid prescription refill for Micronor, an oral contraceptive that may be used as EC,
and Ms. Brauer turned the patient away in accordance with her conscience.102 The
patient complained, and when Ms. Brauer refused to agree to fill all legal
prescriptions in the future, including EC regimens, the employer-pharmacy fired
her.103
B. Tort Liability
A pharmacist, as a professional, has a duty to exercise reasonable care in
practicing her profession.104 The standard of care required to satisfy this duty varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is adopted and applied based on various
sources.105 All jurisdictions require technical accuracy in the administration of
99
See Carol Ukens, Duty vs. Conscience: R.Ph.s Who Refuse to Dispense Raise Ethical
Concerns, DRUG TOPICS, November 3, 1997, at 54.
100

Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM.
BUS. L.J. 653 (2000).
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Karen Brauer, Pharmacy Has a Conscience Problem, at http://www.gargaro.com/
kmart.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Brauer].
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Id.
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104

See, e.g., Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).

105

Some of these sources include national organizations such as the American
Pharmaceutical Association, federal statutes and regulations, state statutes and regulations, and
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prescriptions.106 This includes assuring “the patient receives the correct drug,
dosage, and directions for use.”107 Other standards may supplement accuracy and
require the exercise of the pharmacist’s independent judgment, including being alert
for clear errors or mistakes in the prescription,108 which would implicate a duty to
verify the prescription with the physician or to refuse to fill the prescription.109 Some
jurisdictions require the pharmacist to warn the patient of potential risks or dangers
that taking the drug entails.110
When the pharmacist refuses to dispense and then refers, if she has given a good
faith referral, she has probably satisfied reasonable care.111 Further, because the
patient ultimately received the pharmaceutical care desired, legal action would
probably not be initiated or appropriate.112 If the pharmacist neither dispenses nor
refers, whether the pharmacist satisfied her duty of reasonable care in unclear and the
chance of “injury” to the patient is increased.
Whether the pharmacist may be liable depends first on whether a duty has been
breached – that is, whether refusing to fill a prescription and refusing to refer
breaches the duty of reasonable care.113 A pharmacist’s lack of accommodation to a
woman seeking ECPs or abortion drugs may be considered a breach of duty under
the failure to accurately administer prescription cases.114 In Troppi v. Scarf,115 the
pharmacist filled the patient’s prescription with a tranquilizer rather than the birth
control called for by the prescription,116 and this was held to be a breach of the
disciplinary decisions of state pharmacy boards. See David W. Hepplewhite, A Traditional
Legal Analysis of the Roles and Duties of Pharmacists, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 519 passim (1996).
106
See, e.g., DeCorda v. State, 878 P.2d 73, 76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Baker v. Arbor
Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs,
Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971); see generally, R. Paul Asbury, Comment, Pharmacist Liability: The
Doors of Litigation Are Opening, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 907, 909-912 (2000); David B.
Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Responsibilities of Pharmacists: Should
‘Can’ Imply ‘Ought’?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 439, 444 (1996).
107

Asbury, supra note 106, at 910.

108
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pharmacist’s duty of care.117 The inaccurately filled prescription was a proximate
cause of the ensuing pregnancy and birth of child.118
Women seeking ECPs or abortion drugs may analogize a refusal to fill a
prescription with prescriptions inaccurately filled, as in Troppi, in that the end result
is the same – the patient does not receive the desired and authorized medication and
thus pregnancy or child birth ensues. Further, it will be difficult for the pharmacist
to defend on the ground that the refusal was an exercise of reasonable independent
judgment, as those cases entail refusal on the ground that the prescription had an
error or mistake,119 or doubt existed as to whether the physician intended to prescribe
the medication.120 Here, the only ground for refusal to fill and refer is the
pharmacist’s personal disapproval of the morality of the medication, which could be
considered an unreasonable omission under the current accepted practice of the
profession. Thus, a woman could reasonably argue that the refusal to fill a valid
prescription on moral grounds is a breach of duty.
In Troppi, the woman who was administered the wrong drugs by the negligent
pharmacist sued on account of and was compensated for the harms of pregnancy and
childbirth, which may include medical and hospital expenses and pain and
suffering.121 Many jurisdictions recognize these injuries as the basis of claims often
referred to as wrongful birth, wrongful pregnancy, or wrongful conception.122
Further, a very few courts recognize a limited cause of action for wrongful life, a
claim on behalf of the infant for the injury of being born.123 Most of these wrongful
birth, pregnancy, conception, or life cases involve the acts or omissions of the
woman’s physician. However, as Troppi illustrates, pharmacists may also be liable
for these injuries. A pharmacist’s refusal to dispense ECPs or other abortion drugs
or refer to a willing pharmacist could lead to potentially actionable injuries to the
woman. The woman may become pregnant, and an abortion or childbirth could
ensue and the injuries and losses associated thereto could be the basis of a civil
action. Or the woman might hastily search for another pharmacist who was willing
to dispense the desired birth control, and thus incur emotional pain and suffering in
light of the stress of potentially not taking the drugs within the required timeframe.
All of these ramifications of the pharmacist’s refusal to accommodate the patient
could potentially be the basis of a civil action.124
In any event, the real possibility of pharmacist liability for not dispensing or
accommodating a woman who wants ECPs or other abortion drugs exists. The
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pharmacist must feel safe in following her conscience, and not feel threatened by
potential litigation and liability.
C. Disciplinary Action
The practice of pharmacy is a profession regulated and controlled by the state
through designated statutes and regulations under such statutes.125 The responsibility
of enforcing the state’s pharmacy acts is often delegated to a statutorily created
board,126 which may be authorized to grant a license to practice pharmacy and
discipline a pharmacist for certain acts or omissions.127
Each state’s statute and regulations generally designate the offenses for which a
pharmacist may be subject to disciplinary action, and further what action the state
board may take against the pharmacist. For example, in Ohio the state board “may
revoke, suspend, limit, place on probation, or refuse to grant or renew an
identification card [license], or may impose a monetary penalty[.]”128 The Ohio
statute sets out the offenses for which such disciplinary action may be taken,129 and
further authorizes the state board to adopt rules necessary to carry out the purposes
of and enforce the statute.130 Gross immorality, dishonesty, dispensing drugs without
a valid prescription, and the like are some of the offenses that could result in
disciplinary action by a state board.131
Most disciplinary action involves
“misconduct only with drug diversion and pharmacist impairment issues, but not
with standard of care issues.”132 Further, no state’s pharmacy rules, whether
statutory or administrative, include an obligation to fill valid prescriptions.133
Thus, it seems unlikely that a state board would take any disciplinary action
against a pharmacist for refusing to fill and refer a valid prescription. However, as
the controversy is new and yet untested, the possibility of disciplinary action may
exist in some states. In fact the Executive Director of the National Association of
Boards of Pharmacy (NABP)134 has recognized the possibility of a “very small
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minority” of state boards that may initiate disciplinary proceedings against a
pharmacist who refuses to fill a valid prescription because of personal convictions.135
V. SECTION IV: THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT PROTECTIONS OF A
PHARMACIST’S CONSCIENCE
Various legal avenues are available to a pharmacist who is discriminated against
due to her conscientious refusal to dispense abortion drugs. Religious discrimination
and wrongful discharge claims are the most obvious options for a discharged or
demoted pharmacist. Also, current state conscience clause statutes exist that
generally protect choosing conscience. However, the current legal remedies offer
incomplete, uncertain, costly, and time-consuming protection, if any.
A. Religious Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964136, employers may not
“refuse to hire … discharge … or otherwise discriminate against any individual …
because of such individual’s … religion.”137 Further, an individual’s religion
“includes all aspects of religious observance and practice … unless an employer
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s …
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business.”138 As opposition to abortion is often based on religion,139 it
falls within the ambit of Title VII protection.140
However, in practical terms, Title VII does not offer guaranteed protection in the
context of protecting a pharmacist’s conscience.141 Although the employer must
make reasonable accommodations in light of the pharmacist’s abortion position,142 if
an accommodation places an undue hardship on the employer’s business, the
employer will not be culpable under Title VII for not implementing it.143 Further, the
Supreme Court has interpreted undue hardship as any “greater than de minimus cost
or imposition upon” the employer’s business, including co-workers.144
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In Brener v. Diagnostic Center Hospital145, an Orthodox Jewish pharmacist
claimed that because of his faith, he could not work on the Sabbath, sunset Friday
through sunset Saturday, or various religious holidays.146 All of the plaintiffproposed accommodations were rejected as placing an undue hardship on the
employer’s business.147 These proposals included hiring additional substitute
pharmacists, having the pharmacy director work the plaintiff’s shifts, operating
without the plaintiff-pharmacist, or having the pharmacy director order other current
employees to trade shifts with the plaintiff.148 The first three proposals had the
obvious burden of increasing costs and decreasing efficiency.149 Requiring
employees to trade shifts with the plaintiff was disrupting work-routines and
lowering the morale among the co-workers,150 and had the effect of discriminating
“against some employees in order to enable others to observe” their religion.151
In the context of a pharmacist’s conscientious objection to abortion drugs, many
of the potential accommodations are analogous to those suggested and rejected in
Brener. Assuming a pharmacy adopts a policy of providing service to all customers
for any valid, legal prescription, any accommodation to the objecting pharmacist
probably would result in an undue burden on the employer. For example, a
pharmacy may only require one pharmacist on duty during certain shifts, and when
the objecting pharmacist is scheduled for the “one pharmacist” shift, trading shifts is
not an option because the times when the objecting pharmacist will “observe” her
religion by refusing to fill prescriptions of abortion drugs are likely unknown.
Further, having an additional pharmacist on duty only during the objecting
pharmacist’s shift (in order to handle any objectionable prescription) would clearly
result in economic loss, and thus be an undue burden.152 Also, never scheduling the
objecting pharmacist during the “one pharmacist” shift could result in lowering coworker morale and disruption of work routines, both considered undue burdens.153
A pharmacy that always has more than one pharmacist on duty during each shift,
thus requiring other pharmacists besides the objecting pharmacist to handle
prescriptions of abortion drugs, could also lead to a lowering of morale, and thus be
an undue burden.154 Pharmacists in general do not appreciate having technically
challenging prescriptions pawned off to them by other pharmacists; passing morally
controversial prescriptions to another pharmacist could breed a similar resentment.155
145
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For example, a pharmacist who opposes abortion but gives priority to her
professional duty to the patient (and thus would prescribe such drugs in spite of her
personal conscience) could come to resent the objecting pharmacist who refuses to
dispense abortion drugs.156
The above examples are not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of all the
possible situations in which accommodating an objecting pharmacist could result in
an undue burden. Instead they are intended to illustrate the uncertainty and
inconsistency of pharmaceutical conscience protection under Title VII. Also,
because it is uncertain that a pharmacist is protected under Title VII, the statute may
not deter employers from firing or demoting conscientious pharmacists, thus placing
the affirmative burden on the pharmacist to protect her rights. Further, Title VII
offers no protection against civil suits against the pharmacist, and no direct immunity
from professional discipline.
B. Wrongful Discharge
The conscientious pharmacist may also have a remedy through the common law
tort of wrongful discharge.157 Wrongful discharge is an exception to the employment
at will doctrine in that if the employee’s discharge conflicts with a recognized public
policy, then the employer may be liable in tort.158 Two main reasons exist as to why
a wrongful discharge claim provides weak protection for the conscientious
pharmacist. One, it is uncertain at best whether a state would recognize a public
policy protecting the right to conscience. Also, in most cases where a pharmacist is
fired for following her conscience, the reason for the discharge is not necessarily
because her conscience was followed, but rather that doing so was detrimental to the
business.
The definition of public policy varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and is
constantly evolving and changing in time.159 In any event, where a discharge may be
found to violate public policy is generally limited to four categories: “refusing to
engage in illegal activity at the behest of the employer; exercising a public duty;
asserting a legal right or privilege; or whistleblowing.”160 In the pharmaceutical
context, for a wrongful discharge claim to be viable, public policy must recognize a
right of conscience, that is, a right to refuse accommodating the distribution of
abortion drugs.161 Thus, a wrongful discharge claim would likely fall within the
“asserting a legal right or privilege” category. However, the courts have recognized
a discharge as violative of public policy under this category in limited circumstances,
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Exception, the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, and Other Limitations on
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and a right to conscience has not been among them.162 Further, some courts have
expressly rejected assertions of public policy where the employee’s conduct served
and was motivated by personal or private interests.163
Even if a court recognized a public policy against firing an employee who
follows her conscience, in the context of pharmaceutical care, a wrongful discharge
claim would still probably fail. In Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc.,164 the Ohio
Supreme Court, based on review of cases throughout the country, outlined the
elements necessary to the analysis of a wrongful discharge claim.165 One of the
elements included that the “employer lacked [an] overriding legitimate business
justification for the dismissal[.]”166 Where a pharmacist fails to accommodate a
patient’s valid prescription for legal drugs, deemed safe by the patient’s doctor, the
employer may have legitimate business justifications for dismissing the
pharmacist.167 The refusal to accommodate could result in low morale among the coworkers, patient dissatisfaction with service, or even lost profits. All of these are
clearly detrimental to a business, and thus may prevent a recovery for wrongful
discharge even in light of a court-recognized public policy favoring a right to follow
one’s conscience.
The preceding is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of whether a wrongful
discharge claim would protect a pharmacist. In fact, it may be that existing
conscience clause statutes could provide a powerful basis for a public policy against
discharge for conscientious refusal to accommodate.168 However, in the absence of
clear law on the subject, results are uncertain at best. Because of the uncertainty,
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wrongful discharge may not deter employers from firing or demoting conscientious
pharmacists, thus placing the affirmative burden on the pharmacist to protect her
rights. Further, wrongful discharge offers no protection against civil liability and no
direct immunity from professional discipline.
C. Current State Conscience Clause Statutes
Currently, forty-five jurisdictions in the United States offer some statutory
protection of the consciences of health care professionals.169 The legislative acts
generally recognize a right to refuse participating in controversial procedures on
account of moral or religious grounds and articulate certain remedies and
prohibitions designed to protect the right of conscience. However, only South
Dakota provides conscience legislation specific to pharmacists170 and Illinois has
enacted a comprehensive conscience statute that protects against recriminatory action
against any medical personnel for refusing to act contrary to their conscience, thus
encompassing pharmacists in the context of EC distribution.171 As nearly all
conscience statutes were enacted without regard to pharmacists, these statutes are
deficient in the context of pharmaceutical distribution of reproductive medications in
both their scope and protection.
The great majority of current conscience clauses protect a right to refuse to
participate in “abortion.”172 A few states specifically include a right to refuse to
participate in contraception procedures within their conscience laws,173 thus
including EC within its scope. Most of these “contraception-inclusive statutes” are

169
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ANN. § 65-443 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.800 (Baldwin 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 1299.31 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20-214 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 112, § 12I (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 333.21081-84 (West 2001);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.414, 145.42 (West 1998); MO. ANN. STAT. § 197.032 (West 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-337 to 341 (2000); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 632.475 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to 3 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-5-2 (Michie 2001); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i (McKinney 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. §1445.1 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.91
(Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-741 (West 1996); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3213 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-41-40 , 50
(Law. Co-op. 2001); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001-003 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-306 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.09 (West
2001); 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988).
173
See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-16-304(4)-(5) (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6102(9) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6
(2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225
(1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001); W. VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2000); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2001).
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limited in their protection to either government personnel174 or private sector
personnel,175 while only a few protect any person, and not just private or public
sector individuals.176
The problem with the “abortion-only statutes” is that they may not include EC.177
This is illustrated in a California appellate case where the court held that EC
“constitutes ‘prevention,’ i.e., birth control, rather than ‘termination,’ i.e., abortion”
thus precluding the application of the California conscience clause to a Catholic
hospital’s refusal to disclose information about EC.178 Further, most statutes define
“abortion” as the “termination of a human pregnancy”179 without defining
“pregnancy.” Thus, it is likely that scientific definitions of when pregnancy
commences (at implantation of the blastocyst)180 will control, leaving EC void of
coverage under most conscience legislation.
A further problem with abortion-only statutes is that they protect against
participation or assistance in abortion.181 Thus, if a pharmacist were successful in
persuading a court that EC should be included within the definition of abortion,
another hurdle would arise. The pharmacist would still have to convince the court
that dispensing of EC is a form of participation or assistance in abortion. Some
interpreters of conscience laws may conclude that the pharmacist’s dispensing of
drugs is too far removed an act to qualify as participation, performance, assistance,
or provision of abortion. In fact, the Iowa Attorney General opined that a pharmacist
who prepares the saline solution used in abortions is not performing or assisting in
abortions.182 Thus, it is unclear at best whether pharmacists who refuse to dispense
EC would be considered significant enough actors in the abortion or EC process to
be protected under many conscience clause statutes.
Under the statutes that unquestionably protect the pharmacist in the context of
distributing EC,183 other limitations on the pharmacist’s right to refuse may exist,
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See GA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-6 (2001); Id. § 49-7-2; OR. REV. STAT. § 435.225 (1999); W.
VA. CODE § 16-2B-4 (2000).
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See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102(9) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1903(4) (West 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-104(5) (2001).
176
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4) (Michie 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6)
(West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 42-5-101 (2001).
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See supra Section II.B.
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Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 413 (Cal. Ct. App.

1989).
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See, e.g., OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.11 (Anderson 2001).
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See supra Section II.B.2.
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See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-2151 (1993) (protecting against “participat[ion] in the
medical or surgical procedures which will result in…abortion”); IDAHO CODE § 18-612
(Michie 2000) (protecting against “the performance or provision of any abortion”); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-34-1-4 to 7 (West 1997) (protecting refusal to “perform an abortion or to assist or
participate in…an abortion”).
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1976 Op. Att’y Gen. 478 (Iowa Attorney General opinion March 1, 1976).
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See supra note 173.

2002-03]

THE RIGHT TO REFUSE

99

such as protecting the right to refuse only to the extent the pharmacist refuses to
dispense.184 A referral to another pharmacist could be considered separate and
unrelated to participation in abortion, and thus a refusal to refer would not be
protected against recriminatory action. For many pharmacists referral would be no
less in conflict with their moral convictions than actually distributing ECPs.185
In fact, only four jurisdictions’ conscience legislation includes protection of a
pharmacist’s right to refuse to furnish or provide “information” about contraceptive
therapy.186 A pharmacist who refuses to refer a patient to another pharmacist could
argue that a referral is the provision or furnishing of “information” about EC, and
thus refusing to refer is protected under these statutes. However, if a pharmacist was
successful making such an argument, the protection provided under these four
statutes is limited to protection against civil tort liability.187 The pharmacist’s
employer would not be prevented from discharging the refusing pharmacist, nor
would a state pharmacy board be precluded from initiating disciplinary action if it so
desired.188
The ambiguity of and improbability that current conscience statutes apply in the
pharmaceutical context to all possible objections a pharmacist may have regarding
certain abortion and contraceptive drugs provides a flimsy foundation on which to
enable a pharmacist to avoid contradicting her moral convictions. A pharmacist who
does follow her conscience by either refusing to distribute or refusing to refer is at
the mercy of a judge’s interpretation of the jurisdiction’s respective conscience
statute, and it is not unlikely that such statutes will be interpreted narrowly.189
Further, many conscience statutes are confined regarding what they protect against,
precluding even a sympathetic judiciary from protecting the pharmacist from all of
the various possible consequences of following her conscience.190 Moreover, the
pharmacist should not have to depend on after-the-fact judicial measures to ensure
she will not be punished for following her morals. Law and policy that clearly
recognize the potential moral dilemmas of pharmacists and accordingly provide
broad protection of conscience would put customers and employers on notice so as to
accommodate all. Current conscience statutes fail in this regard.
VI. SECTION V: SOLUTION
Legal protection must serve two purposes in order to appropriately ensure a
pharmacist’s right of conscientious refusal: 1) prevent and deter detrimental
recriminatory action against the pharmacist; and 2) provide adequate remedies in the
184
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1903(4) (West 1992) (protecting one’s right to
refuse to “provide” contraception).
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See supra Section II.C.
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See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4)-(5) (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6102(9) (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.0051(6) (West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34104(5) (2001).
187

Id.

188

Id.

189

See supra notes 178 and 182.
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See supra note 181.

100

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 17:77

case that the pharmacist is sued or disciplined. The most efficient and effective
means to these ends is the enactment of state and federal legislation.
The first step to successful enactment of pharmacist conscience legislation in
each state and the United States is the cooperation of local, regional, and national
pharmaceutical associations. The American Pharmaceutical Association took a large
positive step when it adopted its pharmacist conscience clause.191 However, in the
same pronouncement it rejected adoption of a policy encouraging enactment of state
and national legal protection of the right of conscience.192 If pharmacists themselves,
as represented by their professional associations and organizations, do not call for
state and national legislative action, the road to adequate protection will be more
difficult.193
In any event, an effective conscience statute should take into consideration many
complex issues including broad protection against recriminatory action, efficient
administration of pharmacies, and accommodation of patients. First and foremost
the conscience clause should serve its purpose stating clearly that no pharmacist shall
be required to dispense abortion or EC drugs, nor shall any pharmacist be required to
refer to another pharmacist who will dispense abortion or EC drugs.194 Although
pharmacists currently have no role in the distribution of mifepristone,195 the abortion
language should nonetheless be included as the potential for future pharmaceutical
access exists.196 Next, the conscience statute should prohibit discrimination, civil
liability, and professional disciplinary action that result from exercising the
aforementioned rights of refusal.197 The statute should also encompass provisions
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See supra note 96.
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American Pharmaceutical Association, Report of the House Delegates, Rejected Policy
Proposals, available at http://www.aphanet.org/lead/hod.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2002). The
APhA rejected a policy of urging “adoption of state laws and regulations authorizing a
pharmacist’s conscience clause.” Id.
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At least one state pharmaceutical association has adopted a conscience clause that
recognizes the pharmacist’s right to refuse dispensing and referring. Angela Bonavoglia, Coopting Conscience: The Dangerous Evolution of Conscience Clauses in American Health
Policy, PROCHOICE RESOURCE CENTER (ProChoice Matters series, Port Chester, N.Y.), Jan.
1999, at 4; http://www.prochoiceresource.org/about/CoopConsc.pdf (last visited Apr. 7,
2004). The Pharmacists Society of the State of New York adopted a refuse to dispense and
refuse to refer clause in 1998. Id.
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As South Dakota is the only state with a pharmacist conscience clause, it provides an
example of how the language would appear. The first sentence of South Dakota’s
pharmaceutical conscience clause states that “[n]o pharmacist may be required to dispense
medication if there is reason to believe that the medication would be used to: (1) Cause an
abortion; or (2) Destroy an unborn child as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(50A)[.]” S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (Michie 1998). “Unborn child” is defined as “an individual
organism of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth.” Id. § 22-1-2(50A).
Thus, EC is included in the conscience clause, but no explicit right to refuse referral exists.
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See supra Section II.B
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See supra Section II.B.
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“No such refusal to dispense medication pursuant to this section may be the basis for
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prohibiting discrimination in the hiring process so as to preclude pharmacyemployers from screening applicants to avoid hiring pro-life pharmacists in the first
place.198 Finally, the statute should provide adequate methods of deterrence.
Employment discrimination could be deterred through its criminalization or by
providing an express cause of action in tort as a remedy to the discriminatory hiring,
firing, demotion, or promotion of pharmacists.
Employer and patient considerations should also exist in a pharmacist conscience
clause. Prior notification of a pharmacist’s beliefs regarding abortion and EC should
be disclosed to the employer so as to enable efficient administration of the pharmacy.
Further, patients should be put on notice in advance regarding when pharmacists
with moral objections to abortion and EC will be on duty. For example, schedules
could be posted conspicuously within a pharmacy as to when abortion and EC drugs
will and will not be available to customer-patients. This will enable patients to avoid
the hassle of going to a pharmacy and having their prescription refused. In any
event, matters such as the aforementioned should be considered when drafting a
pharmacist conscience clause.
VII. CONCLUSION
Pharmacists, like other professionals such as physicians and attorneys, have a
general duty to ensure their client’s best interests, and thus must put the health of
patients above all other considerations.199 Thus, it would seem to follow, when a
pharmacist is presented with a valid prescription of what is safe for the patient to
consume, the drugs should be distributed without dispute. However, to require that a
pharmacist, or any professional, participate in what she would equate to the taking of
a human life should never be a principle of professional ethics.
Certain issues, because of their inherent complexity and ambiguity, must be
resolved, with guidance from religion, philosophy, and science, in the heart and mind
of each individual. The commencement of human life and the relative sanctity of
unborn life are issues that fall within this category of subjective individual
determination. The thoughtful decision should be respected and free from vilifying
recrimination. If a pharmacist, in her heart of hearts, concludes that accommodating
prescriptions for abortive and EC medications is akin to directly facilitating the
destruction of a precious human life, a refusal to accommodate such prescriptions
should be protected under the law and within the profession. A safeguard of the
right to refuse is imminently necessary as abortive drugs and EC become more
widespread and risk of liability and loss of employment may compel many
pharmacists to disregard their sacred beliefs or reap the consequences of their
objections. Proactive acceptance of a pharmacist’s conscientious objection to
abortion and EC within the pharmaceutical community would pave the way to
legislative protection already afforded doctors and nurses.200
any disciplinary, recriminatory, or discriminatory action against the pharmacist.” S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (Michie 1998).
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Title VII prohibits discrimination in hiring practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1)
(“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail or refuse to
hire…”).
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